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COMMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THE

COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-

§ 3-16-6: Application-A
Matter of Construction

CEDURE AcT-COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

INTRODUCTION

The coexistence of procedural requirements in the State
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)' and in the organic statutes
of many state agencies frequently presents a dilemma for the
Colorado attorney representing a client in an administrative matter. He must choose the applicable procedures from overlapping
and sometimes inconsistent statutory authority. To guide him in
this choice the final section of the APA provides that "where
there is conflict between the APA and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, such specific statutory provision
shall control as to such agency."' Prior to 1969 this provision had
simply stated that specific statutory provisions pertaining to a
specific agency "shall control as to such agency." ' Implicit in the
addition of the conflict language to section 3-16-6 is the legislature's intent to make procedures in an organic statute and the
APA jointly apply where they parallel each other. The 1969
amendment's expanded definition of the APA's jurisdiction,
which makes it apply "to every agency of the state having statewide territorial jurisdiction" and also "to every other agency to
which it is made to apply by specific statutory reference"' further
evidences the intended overlap. Taken together, these changes
suggest a legislative attempt to delineate the APA's scope and to
clarify its proper application.
Two recent Colorado Supreme Court cases have interpreted
section 3-16-6 as amended: North Kiowa-Bijou Management District v. Ground Water Commission5 and PUC v. District Court.'
'CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-16-1 to -7(Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV, STAT. ANN.
§§ 3-16-1 to -7 (1963). Section 3-16-7 provides that the entire article shall be known and
cited as the "State Administrative Procedure Act."
'CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-6 (Supp. 1969).
'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-6 (1963).
'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-6 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added). Prior to 1969 the
APA's jurisdiction had to be inferred from the definition of "agency" in section 3-16-1.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-1 (1963). The addition of the language quoted in text to
section 3-16-6 obviates the necessity for such an inference by providing a clearly dispositive definition of the APA's jurisdiction.
5505 P.2d 377 (Colo. 1973).
'505 P.2d 1300 (Colo. 1973).
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Although they arose under different statutes, both cases involved
judicial review of administrative action. Unfortunately, neither
opinion adequately examined the possible application of the APA
to the procedural problems involved.
In PUC the court concluded, after quoting the conflict language in section 3-16-6, that the APA should not apply because
"the statutory authority governing the judicial review of PUC
orders and decision is specifically detailed in 1969 Perm. Supp.,
C.R.S. 1963, 115-6-14, 15 and 16."1 In a similar perfunctory manner the court in North Kiowa concluded:
As a threshold matter. . . the Code has no applicability where
a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency provides
a scheme for the administrative control of that agency. Such is the
situation with the Ground Water Management Act. . ., which contains a comprehensive scheme for administering the provisions of
that article!

While PUC does at least acknowledge the existence of the
new APA language, neither opinion addresses itself to an interpretation of the conflict requirement. Specifically, neither opinion lays out any conflict it has found between provisions in the
organic statutes and the APA. The court thus fails to require,
much less define, the statutorily mandated conflict. As a result
the attorney, when forced to choose between the parallel procedures, is left with broad, imprecise standards-whether or not the
organic procedures are "specifically detailed" or constitute a
"comprehensive scheme"-which may sanction arbitrary exclusion of the APA in many situations where it should now apply.
A particularized construction of the conflict language should
have been an important issue in both cases. The problem is the
extent to which a conflict precludes use of the APA. Does any
conflict eliminate the entire APA provision or section in question,
or should the organic statute control only insofar as there is actual, specific conflict, thus leaving the APA's procedures operational on all other points? The question becomes one of legislative
intent and the extent to which the APA's standardized
procedural scheme should supplement organic statutes where
they are silent. This comment will pursue the legislative history
of the 1969 amendment in order to clearly establish an intent to
at 1301 (emphasis added).
1505 P.2d at 379 (emphasis added). The Ground Water Management Act may be
found at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-18-1 to -38 (Supp. 1965).
7Id.
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expand the APA's use and will then suggest a construction of the
amended language which will correctly direct the application of
the coexisting procedures where they conflict.'
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT

A.

Administrative Codes: The Basic Concept
The basic idea underlying the promulgation of an administrative code is the standardization of administrative procedures
in one enactment and the application of those procedures to all
agencies within a jurisdiction. While the concept has won wide
acceptance, in practice many situations exist in which the particular needs of individual agencies require specialized procedures.
Moreover, even in some instances where the merits of such specialized needs are debatable, the special procedures remain
because local concerns-the vested interest of an entrenched bureaucracy or specialized bar-so dictate."'
Where such compromise obtains, as it often does in
Colorado," there are two possible solutions to the inherent problem of conflict between provisions of the organic statutes and the
uniform procedures of an administrative code. First, where specific statutory procedures exist, they could be deemed controlling
and exclusive. PUC and North Kiowa incorrectly suggest this
possibility, although without clearly articulating such a rule. Second, the separate provisions can coexist and jointly apply. Although this solution lacks the definiteness of the first solution, it
allows potentially broader employment of the APA, a preferable
result since the specialized organic procedures, even if they serve
a legitimate, particular need, are often skeletal. 2 Colorado's statutory scheme, the PUC and North Kiowa opinions notwithstanding, should be interpreted so as to follow this second possibility.
B. The Conflict Requirement: Its Origin and Intent
In support of the proposition that the amended language of
section 3-16-6 should be read to increase the APA's use is the
specific origin of the language and the expressed intention of its
'Obviously, in a situation where the organic and code procedures parallel each other
exactly there is no problem of choosing between them.
''More often than not, this situation arises when the organic statute of an agency
predates the adoption of the State APA. See note 11 infra.
"See Henry, The Colorado Administrative Procedure Act: Exclusions Demanding
Reform, 44 DENVER L.J. 42 (1967).
2
See text accompanying notes 30-32 infra.
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author. The origin of the conflict language, and, in fact, the
meaning of the entire provision, has a history unique to Colorado.
The drafters of the Colorado APA worked from both the revised
Model State APA and the final draft of a revised federal code
which was never enacted. 3 Hubert Henry, a longtime Chairman
of the Administrative Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Association and the drafter of much of the language in the Model
State APA, including the 1969 amendment to section 3-16-6,
points out, however, that many changes and additions were made
to conform to Colorado's specific needs. 4 The language in section
3-16-6 is one of these changes, and it represents Colorado's novel
"solution" to the problem of inconsistencies between the APA
and organic statutes. The absence of similar language in other
states negates the possibility of using constructions from other
jurisdictions as a guide. This circumstance places primary importance on the amendment's legislative history. Fortunately,
such legislative history is available and it offers not only insight
into the origin of the amended language, but also directions as to
its proper construction.
The conflict language was first proposed by Henry in a 1967
Denver Law Journal article as the desired judicial construction
of the pre-1969 language of section 3-16-6.1 Arguing for a judicial
interpretation that would increase the APA's use, he contended:
The number of conflicts can and should be held to a minimum by
strictly and narrowly construing the crucial provision that "where a
specific statutory provision applies to a specific agency, 6such specific statutory provision shall control as to such agency.'

The author then proceeded to articulate the interpretation he
would give the provision in words later to be codified in the 1969
amendment:
Only if there is an actual conflict between the APA and the statute
applying to any specific agency, does the latter control, and then
only to the extent of the specific conflict.'"

To whatever degree the language of the statute fails to convey an
exact, statutory command as to the application of the article, the
words and intent of its author should supply the proper direction.
:Henry, supra note 11, at 43.

111d.
"Id.
at 50.
16Id.
'"Id. (emphasis added).
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II. A MATTER OF CONSTRUCTION
The language of the 1969 amendment deserves detailed attention from the court, for it provides a workable, even if not
precise, guide to the legislature's intention. The conflict requirement has suffered, though, from an unfortunate judicial tendency
to apply the APA not according to its own instructions, but in
accordance with traditional rules of common law construction.
In 1968 the Colorado Supreme Court construed the preamendment language of section 3-16-6 in Shoenberg Farms, Inc.
5 The defendants wanted the adequacy of notice issue
v. People."
to be resolved by reference to section 3-16-6 of the APA, but,
according to the court in this case, the state APA is a general law
and "[iut is a general rule of statutory construction that a specific statute prevails over a general one."' 9 There was no need,
however, to resort to this general rule of statutory construction in
order to preclude the application of the APA to this case. A separate provision of the organic statute in question provided that the
organic procedures should control to the exclusion of any general
law. 9 The resulting, unnecessarily broad preemption of the APA
foreshadows the treatment section 3-16-6 received in North
Kiowa and PUC. 1
In Colorado, it is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that in construing amendments a change in meaning must
be attributed to a change in language.2" Furthermore, "[ijn arriving at legislative intent, the language of an amendment must
be construed in light of previous decisions by courts of last resort
"23 Therefore, it must be preconstruing the original act . .
sumed that the legislature had in mind the judicial construction
in the Shoenberg Farms opinion when the 1969 amendment was
passed. Construed in light of the Shoenberg Farms opinion, the
'1166 Colo. 199, 444 P.2d 277 (1968).
"Id. at 215, 444 P.2d at 285.
"CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-23 (1963).
"Colorado is not the only state where the judiciary has limited the applicability of
an administrative code by resorting to the rule that the specific controls the general. Three
Michigan cases dealing with the availability of APA procedures for judicial review where
such procedures were also provided in the organic statutes in question were decided on
the same basis. Superex Drug Corp. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 375 Mich. 314, 134 N.W.2d
678 (1965); Dossin's Food Prods. v. Michigan State Tax Comm'n, 360 Mich. 312, 103
N.W.2d 474 (1960); Imlay T. Primary School Dist. No. 5 v. State Bd. of Educ., 359 Mich.
478, 102 N.W.2d 720 (1960).
"General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 393 (D. Colo. 1956).
"Industrial Comm'n v. Milka, 159 Colo. 114, 120, 410 P.2d 181, 184 (1966).
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clause- "[B]ut, where there is a conflict between this article
and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency,
such specific statutory provision shall control as to such
agency" 2 -should have persuaded the court to abandon its reliance upon a blanket application of the specific-over-general rule
in favor of the more restrictive guidelines set forth by the legislature.
The supreme court should have devoted special attention to
the words "conflict" and "specific." Applying the accepted rule
of statutory construction that "[i]n interpreting words of a legislative enactment . . . the intention of the legislature is to be
found in the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute
when considered in the light of the object to be accomplished or
remedied," 2" "conflict" implies terms directly in opposition, an
inconsistency rather than the mere existence of separate statutory provisions which pertain to the same procedures. Moreover,
the adjective "specific" modifies the phrase "statutory provision," and thus narrows the focus to the exact procedural requirements within a provision rather than to the provision as a whole.
The amended language of section 3-16-6 anticipates, then, the
situation where a particular requirement in an organic statute
would actually vary the application of the uniform procedures of
the APA.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in both the North Kiowa and
PUC opinions, failed to give the words such a detailed analysis
and instead relied on more general impressions to reach its conclusions, saying the APA is not to apply where the organic statute
is "specifically detailed" or constitutes a "comprehensive
scheme." The net result of the court's imprecision is the creation
of a doctrine of preemption that, potentially, could be used to
exclude the APA whenever an organic statute provides any procedures for its administration-a result in direct derogation of the
legislative intent embodied in the amended version of section 316-6.
III. APPLICATION
The foregoing analysis of the legislative intent and statutory
language shows that there are problematic deficiencies in the
supreme court's handling of the applicability questicn in PUC
4
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-6 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
"Blevins v. Truitt, 134 Colo. 88, 90, 299 P.2d 1100, 1101 (1956).

2
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and North Kiowa. Fortuitously, the procedural questions were
not determinative of the outcome in either case. Indeed, if the
issue were restricted solely to the substantive merit of the decisions, the overbroad language would pose no problem.26 The question is rather the value of these two opinions as precedent on the
more general issue of the APA's application where its procedures
are to some degree paralleled in an organic statute.
A. PUC v. District Court
The organic statute involved in PUC specifically incorporates the APA by reference; however, it also states that "where
there is a specific statutory provision in this chapter applying to
the commission such specific statutory provision shall control as
to the commission. '28 Furthermore, section 115-6-15(4) provides
that "[n]o court of this state, except the district court to the
extent specified, shall have jurisdiction to review . . . or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the performance of its official duties ....
,,2" A closer examination shows
that the procedures in sections 115-6-14 to -16 pertaining to judicial review of agency action are more detailed than those in most
organic statutes. Indeed, the section in issue, 115-6-16(2), which
provides for stays pending judicial review, contains procedures
more detailed than those found in section 3-16-5(5) of the APAP0
The more detailed provisions in the organic statute should obviously control in this case.
Still, the court's sweeping exclusion of the APA, however
specifically detailed the PUC's organic procedures may be in
some respects, fails to give the problem the particular analysis it
needs. Because the specific conflicts are not recited, the standard
2

In PUC it was held that Sentry Services, Inc. lacked standing because it was not a
"person" aggrieved by possible self-incrimination, the fifth amendment right being inapplicable to a corporation. The PUC's order to produce records was upheld and the
district court was prohibited from staying it. Application of the APA's procedures would
have had no effect on this outcome. Likewise, in North Kiowa the holding that the review
provisions in the Ground Water Management Act applied only to rulemaking by the
districts and that review of individual adjudications should be in the district courts would
be unaffected by the APA.
27
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 115-6-1 to -21 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 115-6-1 to -21 (1963).

"CoLo.
29

REV. STAT. ANN.

§

115-6-1(1) (Supp. 1969).

1d. § 115-6-15(4) (emphasis added).

:"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-5(5) (Supp. 1969). The organic statute adds the requirement of a hearing upon 3 days' notice. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 115-6-16(2) (Supp.
1969).
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"specifically detailed" remains vague and without content, potentially subject to misuse in cases where the organic procedures
are not as comprehensive. In short, the court should have limited
its holding to the particular sections involved and itemized the
detailed requirements in the organic statute which make it exclusively controlling.
B. North Kiowa-Bijou Management District v. Ground Water
Commission
The North Kiowa case substantiates the potential for misuse
inherent in the sweeping standards the supreme court has articulated. It also provides a good example of the possible uses of the
APA that would be lost thereunder. In North Kiowa the court's
analysis of the applicability problem is limited to one summary
paragraph where the APA is dismissed because the Ground Water
Management Act provides "a comprehensive scheme for administering the provisions of that article."'" The specific statutory provision which would now control the disposition of the case on
remand, however, is far from comprehensive and, as a solution to
the problem of the applicable form of judicial review, it leaves
many questions unanswered.3 2 It provides in pertinent part, "Any
person aggrieved by an act of the district board

.

. .

may appeal

the same to a court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days
of said decision." 3 When compared to section 3-16-5 of the APA
only one actual "conflict" appears and that is the provision which
provides 60 as opposed to 30 days in which an appeal can be
34
brought .
There exist, then, large areas where the organic statute is
silent, but where the APA details the necessary procedures. The
obvious proposition in a situation such as this is that the APA
should be used to fill in gaps in the procedures outlined in the
organic statute; in other words, the APA should be accorded the
status of a procedural supplement. For example, the APA, if applied, could take care of such potentially difficult problems as
1'505 P.2d at 380.
2
I n fact the original statute was silent on this point, a circumstance which brings into
question the validity of the "comprehensive scheme" test the court used to exclude the
APA. The court seems in reality to have been acknowledging an after-the-fact amendment
to the organic statute [CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-30(1) (Supp. 1971)] which did
provide for review in the district court. Interview with John Maley, attorney, in Denver,
Colorado, June 12, 1973.
:"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-30(1) (Supp. 1971).
ICOLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-5(4) (Supp. 1969).
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what constitutes the record on review, the scope of review, and
the procedures necessary to stay action pending review, among
others."
Using virtually indistinguishable standards-"specifically
detailed" and "comprehensive scheme"-the supreme court has
excluded the APA in two vastly dissimilar statutory contexts
(compare the specificity of the review procedures in PUC with the
mere outline in North Kiowa). The court's opinions seem more a
judicial flex of old muscle in the form of familiar rules of statutory
construction than an accurate reading of the statute as it now
stands. The mere existence of parallel procedures in a specific
statute seems to preclude any consideration of the statutorily
required "conflict." Thus, neither opinion offers a functional construction of the amended language of section 3-16-6. The court's
handling of the issue is an invitation to arbitrary and, given the
judicial predisposition, limited application of the code.
CONCLUSION

Employment of all possible procedural guides within the
APA will, of course, not be necessary in every case. In some instances the scheme provided in an organic statute will prove entirely sufficient.36 The important practical result of giving the
APA wider application is that the more comprehensive provisions
are there if needed; moreover, there is also a far-reaching policy
dividend in that the APA procedures will come closer to being the
standard than they now are. Thus, the APA's use and hence its
value can increase if a broadening interpretation is given to the
new conflict requirement. Implicit in this goal is the imperative
that the judicial branch recognize, insofar as the applicability of
the APA is concerned, that the North Kiowa and PUC opinions
must be recast as soon as a suitable opportunity presents itself.
The thrust of the 1969 amendment to section 3-16-6 was to
expand the APA's applicability and use. The statutory conferral
of concurrent jurisdiction joins with the logical meaning of the
language, as well as the expressed intention of its author, to argue
persuasively for that result. Therefore, as a rule, coexisting procedures in the APA and organic statutes should jointly apply in all
instances. Where there is conflict the organic statute should con-Id. § 3-16-5.
"'The review provisions in the organic statute of the PUC come immediately to mind
as one example. COLo REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 115-6-1 to -21 (Supp. 1969).

284

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 51

trol, but only to the extent of the conflict. Where the organic
statute is silent the APA should supplement it. To this end, the
conflict requirement should be interpreted narrowly to mean actual, specific conflict. If so construed, section 3-16-6 will allow
specialized organic procedures to coexist usefully with the more
general provisions of the APA and, when forced to choose between
them, the Colorado practitioner will have a guideline rather than
a dilemma.
William M. Clowdus

